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Understanding the Trust–Control
Nexus
Katinka Bijlsma-Frankema
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Ana Cristina Costa
Delft University of Technology
abstract: This article aims at contributing to the understand-
ing of the trust–control nexus. The objective is to bring the
discussion around the relationship between both concepts a
step further by identifying common foundations, distinctive
mechanisms and key implications relevant for theory-
building and empirical research on trust and control. First,
the concept of trust and related concepts are introduced.
Second, the developments related to the diminished effec-
tiveness of control and a growing importance of trust in both
intra- and inter-organizational relations are discussed.
Finally, the state of the art regarding the trust–control nexus
and a brief summary of the four articles included in this
special issue are provided.
keywords: control ✦ governance ✦ institutional environment ✦
interpersonal relations ✦ opportunities ✦ risks ✦ trust
Introduction
The idea that trust and control might be related has been recently devel-
oped after decades of scholarly focus on formal control as a mechanism
to govern organizational relations. Formal control is, in short, a regulatory
process by which elements of a system are made more predictable through
the establishment of standards in pursuit of some desired objective or
state (Das and Teng, 2001). Formal control aims at establishing task
reliability by designing a set of rules that specify an actor’s work and
enforcing the actor’s compliance with these prescribed standards. In past
decades, due to developments in organizational forms, markets and
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societies, trust has been increasingly recognized as an important factor in
inter- and intra-organizational relationships and has become a major focus
of research in different disciplines, including sociology. Sociologists have
contributed considerably to the scholarly understanding of the phenom-
enon of trust by drawing on classic studies such as Durkheim ([1893] 1960)
on solidarity, Simmel (1950) on social ties, Weber (1947) on authority and
legitimacy, Blau (1964) on choice in social relations and Gouldner (1960)
on reciprocity. Among the matters addressed in studying trust, the
relation with control is one of the most controversial. Over the past years,
scholars have started to address these matters (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema and
Klein Woolthuis, 2005b; Möllering et al., 2001) and to explore the similar-
ities and differences between trust-based and control-based modes of
governance, by focusing on how both modes of governance work if used
in conjunction: can these modes of governance go hand in hand, does
control chase out trust or does trust diminish the need for control? Despite
the increased interest, some of these questions have remained unan-
swered, or have partly been answered so far. This has led to several
alternative notions regarding the relation between trust and control that
have been seldom tested as competing conceptualizations.
In this special issue, four articles are presented, each offering a fresh
angle to analyse the trust–control nexus. In the first article, Möllering
proposes a conceptualization of trust and control as a duality instead of
a dualism. This duality perspective focuses on the underlying question
of how actors reach positive expectations of others. The second article, by
Sitkin and George, offers an unusual approach to the relation between
trust and control by asking the question how trust in managers, when
threatened, can be maintained by employing control to engender legiti-
macy, thereby broaching the theoretical matter of how institutional frame-
works influence relations between individuals.
In the third article, by van de Bunt, Wittek and de Klepper, six theor-
etical mechanisms for the formation of trust relationships are presented
and empirically tested, three driven by the emotional value attached to
social relationships and three by instrumental motives, i.e. the need to
control realization of benefits or avoidance of losses. A rather uncommon
idea implied by the latter three mechanisms is that a need to control may
drive actors to engage in trust relations. By testing the six theoretical
mechanisms simultaneously, the study provides a first comparative evalu-
ation of the theoretical fruitfulness of each mechanism.
The fourth article, by Rus and Iglicˇ, employs a contextual approach to
the relationship between trust and control by investigating the effect of
contracts and trust on small and medium firm performance in two
countries with high and low coherence of the institutional environment
respectively. 
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Before describing the theoretical matters that are dealt with in the
articles, the reader is given a short introduction on the concept of trust
and a sketch of the developments that underscore the growing import-
ance of trust in relation to control as a mechanism of governance.
Trust: Conceptual Issues
Although different definitions of trust abound in the literature and agree-
ment on an exact definition of trust is seldom found, most authors seem
to agree that positive expectations and the willingness to become vulnerable are
critical elements to define trust. Both characteristics are worded in the
definition of Rousseau et al. (1998: 395), ‘trust is a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expec-
tations of the intentions or the behaviour of another’. This suggests, in
the first place, that in essence trust is associated with the risk that the
behaviours of others can do you harm. Gambetta (1988) partly defines
trust as ‘the expectation that another’s action will be beneficial rather than
detrimental’. Second, trust is related to risk-taking. In the words of
Luhmann (1988: 97): ‘If actors choose one course of action in preference
to alternatives, in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the
action of others, they define the situation as one of trust.’ Trust begins
where rational prediction ends (Luhmann, 1979; Gambetta, 1988),
enabling actors to take a leap of faith beyond that which reason alone
would warrant (Simmel, 1950; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Lewis and
Weigert, 1985; Möllering, 2005). Some authors, including Möllering in this
issue, argue that this leap of faith implies suspension of doubt about the
possibility that another’s action will be based on self-interest, assuming
that the other will reciprocate the us-rationality that is signalled by trust
(Lewis and Weigert, 1985).
Bases of Trust
In general, two types of trust can be distinguished in the literature: inter-
personal trust, which refers to trust between people, and system or insti-
tutional trust, which refers to trust in the functioning of organizational,
institutional and social systems. Trust can be embedded in the structure
and culture of institutions to different degrees, as Creed and Miles (1996)
argue. They conceive of trust as a function of three variables: (1)
embedded predisposition to trust; (2) characteristic similarity; (3) experi-
ences of reciprocity. In a similar vein, Zucker (1986) distinguishes three
types of trust: (1) character-based trust, based on social similarities and
shared moral codes; (2) process-based trust, based on experiences of
reciprocity; (3) institution-based trust, flowing from institutional arrange-
ments that evoke and sustain trustworthy behaviours. Broad societal
Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa The Trust–Control Nexus
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norms, guarding institutional arrangements and organizational govern-
ance systems can bring about varying degrees of embedded trust, of
sharing norms and expectations, and of reciprocity. The latter two vari-
ables, sharing and reciprocal exchanges, point at two general principles
of social integration that can be traced back to the work of Durkheim
([1893] 1960), who coined the concepts of mechanical solidarity, based on
shared characteristics and organic solidarity, based on exchanging. By
integrating both principles in a theory of trust, as Creed and Miles do,
instead of treating them separately, a better understanding of trust can be
formed. A similar point is made by Powell (1996) in comparing rational
(i.e. exchange) and social norm (i.e. sharing) models of trust, amending
the latter with notions from the former: ‘societal norm-based conceptions
of trust miss the extent to which cooperation is buttressed by sustained
contact, regular dialogue and constant monitoring’ (Powell, 1996: 69).
Trust Dynamics
It is a matter of common understanding that trust is not static. Once trust
is given to others it can increase or decrease, depending on ongoing inter-
actions with these others and on features of the context in which these
occur. If trusted others live up to expectations of beneficial behaviour,
trust will increase, if these expectations are violated, trust will decrease
(March and Olsen, 1975; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Buskens, 1999;
Gautschi, 2002). Several studies suggest how trust is granted and tested
through a process of incremental steps in which parties increase the level
of interdependence  (Ring and van de Ven, 1994; Larson, 1992; Lewicki
and Bunker, 1996; Gulati, 1995). Based on experiences in small transac-
tions or short relationships, trust is developed together with expectations
of joint future opportunities (Klein Woolthuis, 1999). In contrast, some
authors argue that in specific relationships trust can be built so fast that
it is ‘almost instantly there’, enabling the relationships to start with a high
level of trust (McKnight et al., 1998; Meyerson et al., 1996; Blomqvist,
2005).
March and Olsen (1975) offer a cyclical view on how trust and distrust
develop, which can be applied to incremental and to fast trust-building
alike. In their model, positive exchange experiences are seen as
antecedents of trust, which facilitate sharing seeing and liking, which
promote trust and social integration. Unlike most authors studying trust,
they include the notion of relevance in their theory of trust, which is also
found in the work of Weick (1995). March and Olsen (1975) argue that
organizational members come to trust those who are perceived to bring
about desirable events, or to prevent undesirable events happening, in
areas that they experience as relevant. If actors trust others, they seek
interaction with them, tend to like what they like and see what they see,
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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and to share definitions of relevance, leading to further integration
between them. Distrust creates discord, since if others are distrusted,
actors will tend to dislike what they like, tend not to share their definitions
of relevance and, to the degree that the structure permits them, tend to
avoid interaction with them. In the process of developing trust or distrust,
beneficial events will tend to be attributed to others that are trusted and
detrimental events to those who are distrusted. Trust begets trust, while
distrust begets distrust (March and Olsen, 1975).
Consequences of Trust
There is little disagreement among scholars about the consequences of
trust. Trust is generally acknowledged to smooth relations between actors
(Dirks and Ferrin, 2002; Zucker, 1986; Powell, 1990; Gulati, 1995; Creed
and Miles, 1996; Oliver, 1997) by bringing on a wide variety of positive
attitudes and behaviours towards trusted others. Consequences of trust
found include open communication and information exchange (Currall
and Judge, 1995; Smith and Barclay, 1997), psychological safety
(Edmondson, 1999), commitment (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002; Costa, 2003;
Morgan and Hunt, 1994), belief in information and acceptance of influ-
ence (Blau, 1964; Tyler and Degoey, 1996; Smith and Barclay, 1997; Dirks
and Ferrin, 2002), mutual learning (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Boisot,
1995; Janowicz and Noorderhaven, 2002; Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004), attri-
bution of positive motives (March and Olsen, 1975; Kramer, 1996), and
positive outcomes such as high levels of cooperation and performance
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Gambetta, 1988; Costa et al., 2001; Costa, 2003).
These studies support the theoretical idea that trust lubricates relations
between partners and organizational processes by promoting a variety of
voluntary behaviours that enhance trust-building and performance. Since
many of these benefits have also been associated with modes of control,
the question of how trust is related to control seems relevant enough to
ask and answer. This question is first answered from a developmental
perspective, before turning to the state of the art concerning the
trust–control nexus.
Developments Related to Changes in the
Trust–Control Nexus
The idea of a conceptual relationship between trust and control has been
mainly developed in recent years after many decades of scholarly focus
on formal control as a mechanism of governing organizational relations.
Due to developments in organizational forms, markets and societies, trust
has increasingly been recognized as an important factor in inter- and intra-
organizational relationships. The developments related to the diminished
Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa The Trust–Control Nexus
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effectiveness of control and to the growing importance of trust as a mech-
anism of governance are discussed in the following sections.
Developments Related to Formal Control
Several changes in the realm of control, its sources and its effectiveness
seem related to the growing importance of trust. Control is dependent on
certain characteristics of the situation that are currently under pressure.
First of all, formal control is dependent on the principle of specification
or codification (Boisot, 1995), which means that actions leading to
successful cooperation and exploitation of value can be specified ex ante.
Programmability of tasks and behaviours and measurability of outcomes
are needed to specify expectations in formal contracts or rules, which can
be used to secure equity (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1985; Das and Teng,
2001). This implies that the transaction, task or relationship that actors
take on together should be predictable and codifiable in both its process
and outcome. This seldom is the case with intangible products and with
dynamic processes that are characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty,
which very much typify work and organizations today. Second, formal
control requires the possibility of monitoring to determine if actors deviate
from the rules agreed upon. This implies that parties must be either in
close interaction or have installed intelligent monitoring systems that
allow them to monitor from a distance. Third, effective control requires
an institutional structure that enables enforcement of the contract or rules,
so that a credible threat can be made. This implies the presence of a
suitable juridical structure to sanction deviant behaviour.
Several developments over the past few decades have been hollowing
out the bases for formal control. Due to the speeding up of markets,
continuous change, flexibilization and virtualization of organizational
forms, work relationships have become looser and more distant. It can be
observed that face-to-face relations make way for virtual communication,
that incremental changes are speeding up, and that stable relations are
subject to flexibilization. Virtualization of relations within and between
organizations is also one of the side-effects of globalization, which limits
the possibilities of monitoring and other forms of formal control. For
instance, in e-commerce, business-to-customer relations are difficult to
manage, and gaining customer trust seems almost impossible to do,
especially if the Internet store is not part of a brick and stone company
with a reputation to lose. Yet, Internet stores do manage to gain customer
trust (Kerkhof et al., 2005).
Within organizations, lateral relationships and alliances have become
increasingly important, in contrast to hierarchical relationships that used
to dominate the framing of work relations (Sheppard and Tuschinsky,
1996). New linkages are being formed to achieve and maintain
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
264
01_frankema_055477 (jk-t)  26/7/05  8:37 am  Page 264
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 5, 2011iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
competitive advantage in the marketplace, leading organizations towards
network forms and alliances (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Powell, 1996). In
multinational companies, cross-national and cross-cultural teams are
formed that have to perform based on virtual exchange relations. Due to
diminished capacities to control these exchanges, trust becomes very
important in lubricating cooperation. In addition, organizations have
become increasingly dependent on intangible human resources to gain
and maintain competitive advantage. Extra-role behaviours such as
exploration of opportunities, participation in organizational learning
processes, helping colleagues and cooperation within teams are critical
success factors nowadays (Organ, 1988). Control-based forms of govern-
ance are hardly effective in the leverage of these intangible resources.
While the importance of extra-role behaviours is growing for organiz-
ations to function effectively, hierarchy is less likely to lead employees to
behave in this manner (Kramer, 1996; Tyler, 2003). Trustful relations
between organizational members become crucial because trust can
promote voluntary cooperation and extra-role behaviours needed to
compete successfully.
Flexibilization of work relations is another development that
contributes to looser, and sometimes more virtual relations between
organizational members that are less easy to monitor. It has been demon-
strated that it is harder to elicit extra-role behaviours from temporary
workers (Pearce, 1993). Temporary workers experience a different psycho-
logical contract with the organization than core employees, which moulds
their expectations and actions in a different direction and may complicate
the nature and meaning of exchanges between employees as well (Pearce,
1993; Robinson, 1996).
Besides codification and monitoring, the third reason why formal
control is harder to establish nowadays is the inherent difficulty in enforc-
ing contracts. If cooperative relationships take place across organizational
and geographical borders, it might be difficult to establish a contract that
‘fits’ different law systems, and hard to enforce it. Formal institutions,
contract laws and courts may be poorly developed in some countries,
leaving the contracting partners without a system to fall back upon. The
study by Rus and Iglicˇ in this issue shows the critical importance of well-
functioning institutions to the economic development of a country.
However, in some situations, the institutional framework falls short of
safeguarding the system. In cases of high-tech partnerships, for instance,
where knowledge is ‘fluid’ and often of strategic value, any legal resolu-
tion of conflict will often be too late or in vain (Hoecht, 2005).
In relations between firms, similar developments have made control more
problematic. Formal contracts may be hard to specify because of the
increasing intangible nature of resources and outcomes, the high pace of
Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa The Trust–Control Nexus
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(technological) developments and inherent difficulties of predictability. It
has been observed that tacit knowledge has become more important as a
source of competitive advantage (Lekanne Deprez and Tissen, 2002;
von Krogh, 1998). While potentially a vital resource for effective inter-
organizational cooperation, tacit knowledge is also a highly mobile resource
that moves with the individuals that hold it. This mobility cannot be effec-
tively governed by formal control. Trust-based mechanisms are better fitted
to deal with such valuable, intangible resources. Especially in knowledge-
intensive industries where product life-cycles are short and each genera-
tion of products is expensive to develop, pooling of knowledge, managerial
capacities and capital between firms and sharing risks has become a
strategy on which ongoing vitality rests, as Powell (1990) noted.
With regard to predictability, it can be noted that in high-tech, high-
speed markets, outcome measurability and task programmability are low.
If parties want to specify everything ex ante, this raises transaction costs
to an unsound level and could slow down projects to such an extent that
accurate appropriation of opportunities becomes impossible. If neither the
behaviour of actors nor the outcome can be specified at the beginning,
formal control cannot be exercised in a meaningful way (Eisenhardt, 1985;
Das and Teng, 2001). Trust is a viable alternative in governing these kinds
of relations.
Monitoring has also become increasingly difficult as a result of the de-
localization and globalization of markets. Over the past few decades,
business contacts have been spreading beyond closed groups like local
communities, regions and tribes, but also across specialist fields of knowl-
edge. If parties are located at a great geographical distance, practical
problems may jeopardize effective monitoring. Even when parties are
highly complementary in complex and dynamic industries, this may
entail a large cognitive distance and hence imply difficulties with moni-
toring, i.e. judging the execution of formal contracts or informal agree-
ments. Trust can be an alternative mode of governance in these situations
because the positive expectations trust entails can bridge these distances.
Furthermore, trust can be based on newly constructed similarities
(Bijlsma-Frankema and Klein Woolthuis, 2005b) and help create a
common ground.
Formal Control, Social Control and Trust
If formal control has become less effective in governing relationships, the
question arises whether the conditions that allow for trust-building and
for exercise of control are so different that trust can be conceived of as an
alternative governance mechanism.
Earlier in this introduction, trust was defined as ‘a psychological state’
that presupposes (1) the intention to accept vulnerability and (2) positive
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998) based on characteristic similarities,
positive exchange relations or institutional arrangements that evoke trust-
worthy behaviours (Zucker, 1986; Creed and Miles, 1996). Formal control,
on the other hand, comprises three underlying conditions: (1) need for
codification, (2) monitoring and (3) safeguards. Apparently trust differs
from control on all three points.
First, regarding codification, it has been observed that codified rules
can serve as an indirect source of trust (Rocco, 2005), yet codification of
expectations or agreements is not a necessary condition to trust. While
formal control is dependent on codification of shared rules and exchange
expectations, trust can be based on ‘new similarities’, that are discovered
or created by partners in interaction or in a shared process of meaning
giving to the past, the present or future exchanges, which also creates
common ground (Bijlsma-Frankema and Klein Woolthuis, 2005b). ‘New
similarities’ may range from codified to non-codified rules or expec-
tations, from formal to informal, from concrete to abstract, from estab-
lished rules and expectations to ones newly constructed in interaction
between actors. Next to trust based on reproduction of codifiable rules,
trust can also be based on exploration, learning and (innovative) meaning
giving.
Trust, like control, involves alignment of mutual expectations, because
lack of alignment can give rise to misunderstandings and mistaken
interpretations of well-intended behaviours of the other, leading to a
decline of trust (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2001). This alignment, however, can
be based on explicit interaction between actors, but it can also more
implicitly be rooted in social control, as Das and Teng (2001) argue. They
refer to the concept of clan control as proposed by Ouchi (1979) in describ-
ing social control: 
Clan control is exercised when organisations do not specify task-related behav-
iours and outputs. Instead, here the focus is on developing shared values,
beliefs and goals among members so that the appropriate behaviours will be
reinforced and rewarded. Because members internalise organisational goals,
their commitment and motivation to achieve these goals will be high. (Das and
Teng, 2001: 259) 
Social control is intended to reduce goal incongruence among organiz-
ational members or between partners in an inter-organizational relation-
ship. If implicit embeddedness in shared cultures or structures is lacking,
parties have to invest in relationship building. A large part of this process
will be devoted to developing some shared meaning giving and a shared
understanding of each other and the project one is taking on (Klein
Woolthuis, 1999; Larson, 1992). Especially with complementary partners
that have a large cognitive distance, this might prove difficult. Shared
Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa The Trust–Control Nexus
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meaning giving and understanding is necessary to form the bases on
which parties can judge both the other’s competences and intention
(Nooteboom, 2002).
Second, trust – like control – requires interaction, sometimes in the form
of monitoring. The meaning given to monitoring can, however, be rather
different in the context of trust relations. Showing interest and concern
by closely keeping up to date with the progress the other is making can
be positively interpreted in trusting relations. Heedful interrelating
(Weick and Roberts, 1993) facilitates mutual learning and performance.
Thus, monitoring may well enhance the quality of the relationship and
help parties to flexibly coordinate the relationship. However, monitoring
can also be perceived as a lack of trust between partners, particularly in
contexts of intense group interactions (Costa, 2003). As a result, trust is
more effective than formal control in support of extra-role behaviours of
actors, development of intangible resources and commitment to shared
goals in employing those resources.
Third, unlike control, trust is not based on the explicit threat of enforce-
ment of an agreement. Social control does imply the implicit threat of
social sanctioning if breach of trust is observed. Such sanctioning is only
possible if parties are embedded in (a network of) social relations and if
reputation mechanisms can support exclusion or other social sanctions,
such as gossip or loss of future business relationships.
Social control thus requires less codification and allows for more
abstraction and ambiguity than formal control. The mechanism of social
control tolerates ambiguity necessary to explore opportunities in the
beginning of a relationship, and sustains the development of consensus
on the rules of the game that will guide mutual behaviours (Das and Teng,
2001). Agreement is more a continuous process that is established in recur-
rent stages of evaluation, negotiation and agreeing upon issues as they
occur. In this sense, social control modes of governance will be more
suited to sustain exploration of tacit knowledge and knowledge-based
value creation, whereas formal control modes of governance are more
adequate to sustain exploitation of knowledge (March, 1991; Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995; Boisot, 1995; Janowicz and Noorderhaven, 2002; Weick
and Westley, 1996; Brown and Duguid, 1998; Nonaka and Konno, 1998).
Although most of these authors plead for a balance between exploration
and exploitation, the increasing importance of exploration to competitive
advantage and the ineffectiveness of formal control in governing ex-
ploration, it can be expected that trust will grow in importance as an effec-
tive mode of governance. Yet, it cannot be concluded that a shift to
trust-based forms of governance is a panacea to all problems of govern-
ance in contemporary organizational relations. First, there is ample
ground to expect that all modes of governance, including trust-based
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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forms, produce problems that are typical, unintended consequences of
characteristics of the mode of governance itself (Bijlsma-Frankema and
Koopman, 2004). Contrary to the vast literature on the negative aspects
of formal bureaucratic control (Vroom, 1980), systematic data gathering
on the negative aspects of trust-based governance has been scant until
now. Second, if several of the aforementioned developments have
decreased the effectiveness of formal control they have also weakened the
sources upon which trust can be built. For instance, processes of globaliz-
ation, virtualization and flexibilization reduce both the bases of formal
control and of trust-building. This suggests that as trust is becoming more
important, it is becoming more problematic at the same time (Lane, 2001;
Bijlsma-Frankema and Klein Woolthuis, 2005a).
Understanding the Trust–Control Nexus
State of the Art
The relation between trust and control is a complex one, and research into
this relationship has given rise to various and contradictory interpret-
ations on how trust and control relate (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995;
Anderson and Narus, 1990; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Das and Teng, 1998).
In particular, two main perspectives can be distinguished: the substitu-
tion perspective and the complementarity perspective.
The substitution perspective suggests that trust and formal control are
inversely related, i.e. more formal control results in less trust, and vice
versa (Dekker, 2004). Some adepts of this perspective base their argument
on the economic relevance of trust. Trust provides incentives for cooper-
ation, reduces uncertainty and increases information exchange (Arrow,
1974; Gambetta, 1988; Gulati, 1995; Powell, 1990). Therefore, the higher the
level of trust in relationships, the lower the costs of monitoring and other
control mechanisms (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996; Handy, 1993;
Williamson, 1975) – also Inkpen and Currall (1997) note that lower trust
levels lead to more formal operational procedures, such as more detailed
contract documentation, more frequent board meetings, etc. The substitu-
tion view is consistent with more traditional management perspectives
that conceptualize trust and control as equivalent strategies for reducing
uncertainty, complexity and dealing with the freedom and indeterminacy
of others (Knights et al., 2001). Both trust and control allow for the develop-
ment of expectations with regard to social actors’ future behaviours, and
increase predictability (Luhmann, 1979; Nooteboom, 2002). Therefore, they
are considered to be alternate routes for arriving at stable orders to which
social actors can orient their behaviour (Gulati, 1995).
The other perspective elaborates on a complementary relation between
trust and control (e.g. Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Das and Teng, 1998;
Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa The Trust–Control Nexus
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Sitkin, 1995; Zucker, 1986), suggesting that trust and control can be
mutually reinforcing. Sitkin (1995), for instance, argues that formal control
mechanisms may increase trust by providing people with objective rules
and clear measures on which to base their assessments and evaluations
of others. Trust and control can both contribute to the level of cooperation
needed in a relationship.
So far, empirical research has not yielded decisive support for one
stance over another. Within organizations, Costa et al. (2001) found that
trust between members in work teams is positively related to cooperative
behaviours and negatively to monitoring colleagues, indicating that trust
can work as a substitute for control. Currall and Judge (1995) and Smith
and Barclay (1997) arrive at a similar conclusion. In manager–subordinate
relationships, on the other hand, Bijlsma-Frankema and van de Bunt
(2002) found that subordinates’ trust in managers is positively related to
the monitoring behaviours of managers, thus indicating that trust and
control can go hand in hand without tension. These contradictory findings
may be explained by taking the relation between trust and risk more
systematically into account. Sitkin and George (this issue, pp. 307–38), for
instance found that under conditions of higher perceived threat to trust
in managers, managers use more formal controls and less informal
controls to legitimize their decisions.
In studies of trust between organizations, support has also been found
for both points of view. Gulati (1995), for instance, suggests that trust
reduces the need for equity-based structures to coordinate and control
alliances. Similarly, Powell (1996) argues that in the absence of ‘natural’
conditions for trust development, such as familiarity based on past experi-
ences of characteristics of similarity, inter-firm collaborations rely more
on formal and institutional base arrangements, which is more costly and
time consuming. In contrast, Dodgson (1993) advocates the need for
formalization in order to ensure that the collaboration between firms
continues successfully. He refers to fragility of trust as a governance mech-
anism, particularly in situations of continual organizational change and
high mobility of the workforce.
A Matter of Theoretical Understanding
It can be argued that since at present the relation between trust and control
is far from clear (Maguire et al., 2001; Sydow and Windeler, 2003), more
theoretical input is needed to fully understand how trust functions as a
governance mechanism and how it relates to formal control. As Bachmann
et al. (2001: v; cited in Möllering, this issue) contend: ‘While there are
numerous examples in the literature where control chases out trust and
situations in which trust seems to remove the need for control, there are
equally as many examples of trust and control being complementary or
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going hand in hand.’ So far, empirical evidence has not been very helpful
in sorting out which conceptualization of the relation is most adequate.
This may be due to several factors, of which three are discussed here:
an empiricist tendency dominating the discussion, especially in studies
of inter-organizational relations; a lack of theoretical contributions and
inspiring theoretical questions; and too little theoretical and empirical
attention to diversity of contexts that may differentially influence the
nature of the relation between trust and control.
First, in the past years, the level of theorizing involved in argumenta-
tions and research regarding the trust–control relation has been rather low.
For instance, the concepts of substitutes and complements, which are
mostly used to frame the relation, are seldom supported by theoretical
statements that build on robust parts of the social scientific heritage. Most
of the time, these concepts are used in a rather empiricist way, describ-
ing the relation between trust and control in terms of near-operational
coexistence, sometimes straightforward in terms of correlations to be
found between operational measurements of both phenomena, as in the
study of Alvarez et al. (2003). However fruitful such an approach may be
to overcome apparent equivalency of theoretical statements, relying on
statistics to create theoretical understanding of the trust–control relation
is bound to produce poor results, no matter how much energy scholars
put into this quest. Progress can be made by shifting attention to theor-
etical work on the trust–control nexus until sufficient understanding has
been reached to test competing conceptualizations to build more robust
insights. Apart from a few exceptions, including a timely study by Sitkin
(1995), in which several theoretical arguments are presented for a positive
effect of control on trust, the theoretical debate on the trust–control
relation has been rather thin in the past decade. Another flaw in the realm
of theorizing is that in the past decade hardly any questions have been
asked that have resulted in exploration of new theoretical alleys and
angles to address the trust–control nexus.
New Questions, New Understandings
The studies in this special issue of International Sociology all address these
theoretical weaknesses by broaching new themes or asking questions that
stir up new ways of theoretically making sense of the trust–control nexus.
The study by Guido Möllering, ‘The Trust/Control Duality: An Inte-
grative Perspective on Positive Expectations of Others’, addresses these
theoretical weaknesses by offering a fresh theoretical approach to the
trust–control nexus and by reframing the trust–control question in a
productive mode. Möllering theoretically turns against a conceptualiza-
tion of trust and control as unrelated concepts, that can vary indepen-
dently. He proposes a conceptualization of trust and control as a duality
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instead of a dualism. Accordingly, trust and control each assume the exist-
ence of the other, refer to each other and create each other, but remain
irreducible to each other. This duality perspective focuses on the under-
lying problem of how actors reach positive expectations of others. By
posing the uncommon question of how actors do arrive at positive expec-
tations of others, a new light is shed on the trust–control relation and the
door is opened to theoretical insights that can be employed to further
theoretical understanding of the trust–control relation. On the basis of an
assumption of embedded agency, the duality perspective on trust/control
holds that actors form positive expectations of others by interpreting
complex interactions between structural influences on actors and the
possibility of either benevolent or malevolent action. As certainty cannot
be reached, positive expectations also require suspension.
Implications of the proposed trust/control perspective are presented,
discussing the pitfalls of ignoring or adopting it as well as the oppor-
tunities from embracing it.
The study by Sim Sitkin and Elizabeth George, ‘Managerial Trust-
Building Through the Use of Legitimating Formal and Informal Control
Mechanisms’, offers a new thought of approach to the relation between
trust and control by asking the question how trust in managers, when
threatened, can be maintained by employing control to engender legiti-
macy, thereby broaching the theoretical matter of how institutional frame-
works influence relations between individuals. Three versions of
institutional theory are tested in a comparative design. The article
examines formal and informal control mechanisms used by organizational
decision-makers to engender trust by invoking the protective patina of
institutional legitimacy when making potentially controversial decisions
that could damage trust. Two experimental studies found consistent
patterns of use of persistent formal controls and reduced use of informal
controls under higher levels of perceived threat to trust. This finding is
consistent with the ‘attenuated legalistic’ institutional perspective on the
use of formal and informal control, and inconsistent with mainstream
institutional perspectives on the use of controls. Results suggest insti-
tutional pressures manifest at the individual level provide a complemen-
tary focus to macro-organizational institutionalization.
The study by Gerhard van de Bunt, Rafael Wittek and Maurits de
Klepper, ‘The Evolution of Intra-Organizational Trust Networks’, also
contributes to a more theoretical understanding of the trust–control nexus
by bringing insights from the field of network development into the arena,
on which new questions can be based. In this study, six theoretical trust
mechanisms, all based on rather robust parts of the social scientific
heritage, are presented and tested on case material of network develop-
ment. Based on the distinction between expressive and instrumental
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motives, six theoretical mechanisms for the formation of trust relation-
ships are elaborated and empirically tested, three driven by the emotional
value attached to social relationships (homophily effect, balancing effect,
gossiping effect) and three by instrumental motives, i.e. the need to control
realization of benefits or avoidance of losses (signalling effect, sharing
group effect, structural hole effect). While the first three motives can be
recognized as antecedents of trust based on similarities between actors
(Zucker, 1986; Bijlsma-Frankema and Klein Woolthuis, 2005b), the latter
three motives are at present not commonly recognized as antecedents of
trust. The instrumental motives approach departs from the idea that work
settings generate specific constraints on the formation of trust relations.
Two theoretical arguments are presented to support the idea of instru-
mental motives. The first line of reasoning emphasizes the impact of
formal organizational structures, in particular functional interdependen-
cies, on the one hand, and the formal control strategies associated with
the hierarchical position of actors, on the other. Interpersonal trust is
modelled as a function of formally defined patterns of interdependence
and power. Individuals adapt to their formal work environments, they
manage critical dependencies by embedding them into social exchanges.
The second line of instrumental reasoning argues that interpersonal trust
relations are the result of individual actors who actively try to optimize
the benefits that their personal networks can generate. Individuals benefit
from brokerage positions, and will therefore try to change the network
structure to increase their brokerage opportunities. Data for an empirical
test of these mechanisms are taken from a sociometric panel study of 17
members of the management team of a German paper mill. Actor-oriented
statistical modelling shows that all effects significantly affect trust forma-
tion separately. In a simultaneous test incorporating all six mechanisms,
the pattern of structural holes turns out to be the major predictor of
network evolution. Thanks to the cross-fields transfer of theoretical ideas,
the trust mechanisms presented and the test findings of this study can be
expected to produce new theoretical challenges and synergetic effects, on
which future insights may be built.
Rus and Iglicˇ’s study, ‘Trust, Governance and Performance: The Role of
Institutional and Interpersonal Trust in SME Development’, brings up an
equally fresh theoretical matter by bringing in the institutional environ-
ment as an important factor that influences the combinations of trust and
control employed by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in a given
environment and the performance of these firms. The article explores the
relationship between trust and control by investigating the direct and
indirect effects of different types of trust on company performance. A
survey of small and medium size firms in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herze-
govina is used to demonstrate how the level of trust entrepreneurs have
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in institutions and business partners influences the choice of governance
mechanisms that coordinate economic activities among actors. The article
shows that the institutional environment in Slovenia generates more trust,
which enables actors to base their business relationships on trust rather
than contract. In addition, when actors rely on trust it is usually insti-
tutional trust rather than interpersonal trust. In contrast, in Bosnia, a
weaker institutional environment generates less trust, leading actors to
base their economic relationships on contract. However, when trust is
used in Bosnia as a basis of business relationships it is likely to be centred
on interpersonal trust. These results have important implications for the
understanding of the process by which trust affects economic perform-
ance. The use of institutional trust as a basis for governance mechanisms
may lead to increased economic performance of companies due to the
inclusive nature of sociability patterns and tie formation, since institutions
generalize trust beyond a specific set of exchange partners. The use of
interpersonal trust may limit its economic potential due to its reliance on
strong ties embedded within cohesive groups marked with closure.
Bringing the Context Back In
A last factor that may have contributed to the current state of the art
regarding the trust–control nexus is that little systematic attention has
been paid to contextual factors that may explain a fair share of the
variance in trust–control relations found so far. Reframing questions about
the trust–control nexus to include the context in theoretical and empiri-
cal studies seems a promising turn to take, although the complexity of
the matter studied is increased as well. All four studies in this issue
contribute to addressing this challenge by employing some form of
contextual approach.
Van de Bunt et al.’s article introduces the formal structure of an organiz-
ation, i.e. functional dependencies and formal control strategies associ-
ated with the hierarchical position of actors, as a contextual factor that
may influence the way individuals manage their critical dependencies by
embedding them in a trust relationship. Sitkin and George also take
control strategies of managers, formal and informal, into account as
antecedents of trust-building in intra-organizational relations and of trust
maintenance under threat, but they conceptualize control in reference to
the set of legitimate rules conventions, cognitions and meanings
comprised in the institutional environment of organizations. This move
enables the authors to reopen the dossier on institutional pressures on
decisions of individuals, which since being initiated by Zucker (1977) has
lain barren. Bringing the institutional framework into understanding the
trust–control nexus is a major step forwards, and which lately has been
advocated by several authors. Yet, this will not be an easy endeavour. The
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third base of trust-building Zucker (1986) distinguished is recently
typified as a rather undifferentiated, encompassing set of rules and mech-
anisms that is in need of further exploration. Bachmann (1998: 319), for
instance, argues that many elements of the institutional framework should
be taken into consideration in examining how social actors engage in
exchange relations, but that insight in the nature of the relations between
these factors is scarce: 
As yet we equally know little about how different elements of the institutional
framework such as legal regulations, the status and role of trade associations,
the financial system, etc. interact with each other. These issues need to be
studied very thoroughly through comparative research.
The comparative study by Rus and Iglicˇ supports the relevance of this
endeavour and opens the door to a new line of research in which charac-
teristics of the institutional environment will play a prominent part in
explaining differences in the relation between trust, control and perform-
ance of firms. The study shows that the question of how institutional
pressures influence relations between individuals is a relevant one, which
promises to enhance scholarly understanding of contextual factors that
differentially affect the relation between trust, control and firm performance.
Möllering’s study also embraces the institutional environment as an
important factor in building and maintaining human relations. Möllering
inventively realigns the phenomena of trust and control by asking the
simple question of how actors form positive expectations of others. When
an actor rests positive expectations on structural influences on the
embedded other, he or she speaks of control; when an actor rests positive
expectations on an assumption of benevolent agency on the part of the
other, he or she speaks of trust. The concept of embedded agency (Garud
and Karnøe, cited in Möllering), which is of central importance in this
study, entails that actors are both constrained by social structures and
carriers of structure through contingent and purposeful action. This
conceptualization of the trust–control nexus has several advantages over
the rather bloodless and suboptimally framed question of whether trust
and control are substitutes or complements. First, it may prove useful in
addressing the important question of how institutional pressures influ-
ence individual decisions, which Sitkin and George propose to reinstall
on the social scientific research agenda. Second, if this conceptualization
is adopted, the study of different elements of the institutional framework
and their interaction through comparative research, as advocated by
Bachmann (1998: 319), will become more urgent and more promising at
the same time. A third advantage is that by thinking in terms of struc-
tural influences, a one-sided focus on constraints is replaced by a more
open focus that allows analysis of constraints and opportunities inherent
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in organizational structures or institutional frameworks at the same time.
While most studies of control tend to concentrate on constraints and most
studies on trust focus on risks rather than on opportunities for value
creation (Bijlsma-Frankema and Klein Woolthuis, 2005b), the studies of
van de Bunt et al. and of Rus and Iglicˇ, by virtue of the network approach
chosen, do pay attention to opportunity-driven tie formation. Figure 1
shows how the questions asked can be framed to do more justice to the
institutional environment next to interpersonal and network relations.
The figure pictures four paths to positive expectations, which entail a
favourable risk–opportunity balance: starting at interpersonal relations or
at the institutional framework while each can run via trust or via formal
control. In understanding different combinations of paths to positive
expectations, March and Olsen’s (1975) concept of areas of relevance may
prove helpful in future research to relate perceptions of risks and oppor-
tunities to combinations of paths found.
Future developments may also bring the need to develop more dynamic
representations of the trust–control nexus, since the matter of understand-
ing the processes of trust and control formation can be expected to grow
in importance in the years to come. The longitudinal data that are needed
for dynamic analysis will not only provide more robust ground for
making causal inferences, but can also promote our understanding of how
changes in one factor, for instance loss of trust in a relationship, bring
about changes in another factor, for instance change in the nature of
control employed. Dynamic network analysis may turn out to be a very
apt way to gain a hold on complicated processes of trust and control
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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formation within the institutional environment. The article by van de Bunt
et al. in this issue provides a taste of the theoretical and instrumental value
of this new method of analysis that is at present in development.
It can be concluded that our understanding of the trust–control nexus
has been and will be promoted by a shift to more theoretical explorations,
as the studies in this special issue show. Given the freshness of the ques-
tions asked, it seems not too far-fetched to conclude that a lot of promis-
ing work lies ahead.
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